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Abstract— We design codes to transmit information over a
network, some subset of which is controlled by a malicious
adversary. The computationally unbounded, hidden adversary
knows the message to be transmitted, and can observe and
change information over the part of the network he controls. The
network nodes do not share resources such as shared randomness
or a private key. We first consider a unicast problem in a network
with |E| parallel, unit-capacity, directed edges. The rate-region
has two parts. If the adversary controls a fraction p < 0.5 of
the |E| edges, the maximal throughput equals (1 − p)|E|. We
describe low-complexity codes that achieve this rate-region. We
then extend these results to investigate more general multicast
problems in directed, acyclic networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following point-to-point adversarial chan-
nel coding problem. The network G consists of |E| par-
allel, directed, binary-input, binary-output edges E =
{e1, e2, . . . , e|E|} between the source s with encoder Xavier
and the sink t with decoder Yvonne. At time i, source s
generates R Bernoulli-(1/2) random bits {Xi,j}Rj=1. Encoder
Xavier wishes to describe these bits across the network. Xavier
also has access to a fair coin, which he can use to generate as
many bits as he wants. Xavier and Yvonne share no private
key or common randomness. Xavier wishes to transmit all the
information generated by s to Yvonne, who wishes to decode
the received message with asymptotically negligible proba-
bility of error. Xavier and Yvonne agree on low-complexity
encoding and decoding schemes in advance. The encoding
and decoding schemes are also known to the computationally
unbounded adversary Zorba. The adversary Zorba knows the
message generated by s but not the outcomes of Xavier’s
coin flips. Zorba can also see and control the transmissions
on Z ⊆ E , where Z has size M ; Zorba cannot observe or
change transmissions on E −Z . Zorba wishes to minimize the
rate R at which Yvonne can reconstruct the information from
s with asymptotically negligible probability of error. Zorba’s
interference patterns on the links he controls can be based
only on the knowledge he already possesses (code-design,
source message, and causal knowledge of symbols transmitted
on links he controls). We note, however, that the rate region
is identical even if Zorba has non-causal knowledge of the
information transmitted on links he controls. In this paper, for
simplicity, we concentrate on causal adversaries and leave the
details when considering non-causal adversaries to [1].
Previous work [2] exhibits a low-complexity algorithm
for each receiver to detect an adversarial attack with high
probability as long as there is at least one packet in the network
whose contents the adversary cannot infer.
We obtain an intriguing two-part rate-region for the
corresponding error-correction problem. We construct low-
complexity block codes, which for large enough block-length
n asymptotically achieve the capacity CAdv(M, |E|) = (|E| −
M)1(M/|E| < 0.5) of this channel model. Indicator function
1(·) is one when its argument is true and zero otherwise.
Viewing the ratio M/|E| as the noise parameter of this
adversarial channel, the capacity of the channel for the regime
M/|E| < 0.5 equals |E|(1 − M/|E|). That is, it equals the
capacity of |E| parallel binary erasure channels (BECs) with
erasure probability M/|E|. This result is striking since the
location of all erasures is explicitly known to the decoder of
an erasure channel whereas Z is unknown to Yvonne. Indeed,
our code construction relies on BEC channel codes. The
construction also employs parity information, which enables
Yvonne to estimate with high reliability the subset JZ ⊆ Z
that Zorba corrupts. Yvonne then decodes the messages on
E−JZ . Conversely, we show that no matter which code Xavier
uses, if he transmits at a rate higher than CAdv(M, |E|), then
there exists a strategy by which Zorba can force Yvonne’s
probability of decoding error to be bounded away from 0.
Section II we present our results for the case where the
network consists of parallel edges. These set the stage for the
more interesting multicast model of Section III. In general
non-trivial coding needs to be performed at internal nodes
in order to achieve the multicast capacity [3]. This makes
error-correction harder than in the parallel link case, since
in principle the information injected into the network by an
adversary controlling even a single link can contaminate all of
the information reaching any receiver.
In Section IV treats generalizations. These include allowing
small amounts of feedback, which increases the rate-region
to (|E| −M), and knowledge at the sinks of the adversary’s
location, which enlarges the rate-region to (|E| − M). In
contrast, knowledge by the source of the adversary’s location
leaves the region unchanged. We also show a separation
between channel and network coding for this problem. That is,
if the links in the network in addition to possible adversarial
interference also have random noise, then network coding to
combat the adversary’s actions can be overlaid on top of link-
by-link channel coding. We also provide an algorithm for
detecting which edges need to be removed from the network so
as to eliminate the contamination from the information being
injected by adversaries. Lastly, we consider the case where
the adversary does not know the message at the source, and
show that the maximal rate at which secret information can be
embedded in an information-theoretically secure manner into
the message being transmitted equals (1−2p)1(M/|E| < 0.5).
II. UNICAST MODEL
We start with results for the parallel-edge unicast model.
We block both source bits and Xavier’s random coin flips
into m-dimensional vectors that we treat as elements of the
finite field Fq, where q = 2m. The source input vector is
X = (X(1), X(2), . . . , X(n))T , where each X(i) vector
comprises R elements of Fq. Thus X(1), . . . , X(n) represents
the R source bits from the first mn units of time. The m-vector
of random coin outcomes is ρ ∈ Fq
A code C is defined by its encoder {fe}e∈E and decoder
h. For each e ∈ E , fe : (Fq)nR × Fq → (Fq)n maps a
source vector X and random symbol ρ to the length-n vector
Y (e) = Y (e, i) = fe(X, ρ) transmitted across edge e. We
use Y = f(X, ρ) = (fe(X, ρ))e∈E to denote the full channel
input and Yˆ = (Yˆ (e))e∈E to describe the full channel output.
In particular, we use the length-|E| vector Y (i) to denote the
channel input at time i and Yˆ (i) to denote the channel output at
time i. A decoder h : (Fq)n|E| → (Fq)nR maps the collection
Yˆ of received channel outputs to a reconstruction Xˆ = h(Yˆ )
of source message X .
Xavier and Yvonne together choose a code C =
((fe)e∈E , h). This code choice is fixed and known to Zorba,
who also has full knowledge of the source message X to
be transmitted. Zorba uses this information to choose the
jamming function g used to corrupt the channel input Y to
give channel output Yˆ . In designing his jamming function,
Zorba first chooses a set Z of edges to control. The size
of Z cannot exceed M , the jamming dimension. For each
e ∈ E − Z , Yˆ (e) = Y (e). For each e ∈ Z , Zorba uses
jamming functions ge : (Fq)nR×(Fq)nM → (Fq)n to produce
Yˆ (e) = ge(X, (Y (e))e∈Z); thus the corrupted information on
any edge e ∈ Z can rely on both the source message X and
causally on the channel inputs Y (e) on all edges e ∈ Z . For
notational simplicity we henceforth write Yˆ = g(X,Y ) to
denote the full collection of channel outputs.
The error probability is defined as P (n)e =
Pr[h(g(X, (Y (e))e∈Z ))] = X). Rate R is achievable
for the channel g for jamming dimension M if for any
 > 0 and n sufficiently large there exists a blocklength-n
code C with P (n)e <  for every jamming function g in the
family of jamming functions described above. The capacity
CAdv(M, |E|) equals the maximal achievable rate over all g.
We now state and prove our main result for unicast channels.
Theorem 1:
CAdv(M, |E|) = (|E| −M)1(M/|E| < 0.5)
Further, for any n and any m = ω(log(n|E|)) there exists
block-length n codes with R = (1−(|E|+1)/n)CAdv(M, |E|),
P
(n)
e < n|E|2−m, and complexity of design and encoding and
decoding implementation equal to O((nm|E|)2).
Proof: Upper Bounds: The bound R ≤ |E|−M is immediate
since Zorba can set Yˆ (e) = 0n for all e ∈ Z , thereby giving
rate zero on all edges controlled by Zorba.
If M ≥ |E|/2, R = 0 since Zorba can use the following
strategy to make decoding with P (n)e < 1/2 impossible. Zorba
selects an arbitrary jamming subset JZ of size |E| − M of
Z . Then, for arbitrary X ′ = X and ρ, Zorba sets Yˆ (e) =
fe(X ′, ρ′) for each e ∈ JZ and Yˆ (e) = 0n for e ∈ Z − JZ .
Yvonne does not know Z and is therefore unable to decide
which of X and X ′ to decode to, leading to a probability of
error of at least 1/2.
Lower Bound: We first sketch the achievability argument
and then give a precise code construction. Assume M/|E| <
1/2 and R = |E| − M . In the first n − |E| − 1 symbols
on each e ∈ E Xavier transmits X using an erasure code.
Xavier uses the remaining E + 1 symbols to send a header
containing ρ and D = (D(e))e∈E . The vector D is a hash of
the vectors (Y (i))n−|E|−1i=1 with ρ. Yvonne decodes by looking
for consistency among the received channel outputs. Since
Zorba controls fewer than half of the edges, Yvonne can
determine (ρ,D) using a majority rule. She then recomputes
the hash using ρ and the received transmissions. Since Zorba
does not know ρ a priori, any changes he makes on (y(e))e∈Z
will with high probability be inconsistent with the hash values.
This enables Yvonne to determine which edges have been
corrupted. She then uses Yˆ (e) from e /∈ JZ to reconstruct
Xˆ , via the erasure code.
We now describe our coding scheme in detail. For any n
and m = ω(log(n|E|))), fix R = (1−(|E|+1)/n)(|E|−M)
and design the functions fe using the following procedure.
Let L be any (n − |E| − 1)|E| × nR Vandermonde matrix
over Fq (such a matrix exists since q = 2m and m =
ω(log(n|E|))) [4]. For the ith edge ei ∈ E , the matrix L(ei),
known a priori to Xavier, Yvonne, and Zorba, is defined
to be the (n − |E| − 1) × nR matrix consisting of row
[(n− |E| − 1)(i− 1) + 1] through [(n − |E| − 1)i] of L. For
all e ∈ E we define T (e), U and D as
T (e) = (L(e)X)T ,
U = (1, ρ, . . . , ρn−|E|−1) and
D = U [T (e1) . . . T (e|E|)].
and set Y (e) = [T (e), D, ρ]. Thus for each e ∈ E , the first
n − |E| − 1 symbols in Y (e) are the erasure-coded message
symbols, the next |E| symbols are the hash function output,
and the last symbol is the hash-function’s key ρ.
Yvonne’s decoding scheme h is as follows. Let Yˆ (e) =(
Tˆ (e), Dˆ, ρˆ
)
denote the channel output on e ∈ E . As
described above, Yvonne first determines the correct value of
the header (D, ρ) by choosing the value that appears on the
majority of the links. She then checks, for the ith edge ei ∈ E ,
whether D(ei) equals the ith symbol in U(Tˆ (e1) . . . Tˆ (e|E|)).
She calls the set of edges for which this is true ED.
In the second stage of decoding Yvonne constructs LD, a
|ED|(n − |E| − 1) × nR matrix created by concatenating the
matrices in {L(e)}e∈ED . Since L is a Vandermonde matrix,
so is LD . Yvonne obtains Xˆ by inverting the matrix equation
YˆD = LDX , where YˆD is the dimension |ED|(n − |E| − 1)
vector obtained by the ordered concatenation of Yˆ (e), e ∈ ED.
There is a decoding error only if EJ ∩ED = φ, where EJ ⊆ Z
is the set of edges for which Tˆ (e) = T (e). We next bound the
probability of this event.
It suffices to prove that with probability 1 − n|E|2−m, for
no ei ∈ EJ is D(ei) = UTˆ (ei) true. By definition of EJ ,
T (e) = Tˆ (e). Thus U(T (e))T = U(Tˆ (e))T , i.e., U(T (e) −
Tˆ (e))T = 0, only if ρ is a root of the degree n − |E| − 1
polynomial U(T (e)− Tˆ(e))T . Zorba does not know the value
of ρ, and the polynomial contains at most n− |E|− 1 roots in
the field of size 2m. Therefore e /∈ ED are inconsistent with
probability at least 1−(n−|E|−1)/2m. Since there are fewer
than |E|/2 edges in EJ , the total probability that EJ ∩ED = φ
is at most (n− |E| − 1))|E|/2m+1 < n|E|2−m.
Lastly, it can be verified that the complexity of encoder fe
at each edge e is determined by the complexity of computing
the vectors T (e) over a field of size q, and that the complexity
of decoder h is determined by the complexity of inverting a
Vandermonde matrix of dimension nR over the same finite
field [4]. 
Note 1: Most Maximum Distance Separable codes [5] can
be used in place of L. We choose Vandermonde matrices due
to their low design and implementation complexity.
Note 2: Even if Zorba’s jamming functions ge are allowed to
violate causality, a result with identical rate-regions and codes
with similar parameters to those in Theorem 1 still holds. A
proof using a variant of Verifiable Secret Sharing ([6],[7]) can
be found in [1].
III. MULTICAST MODEL
We now examine the problem of multicasting informa-
tion on more complex networks with a hidden adversary.
We assume that G = (V , E) is a directed acyclic net-
work with unit-capacity directed edges. For a node v ∈ V ,
ΓO(v) denotes set of the edges outgoing from v and ΓI(v)
denotes the set of edges entering v. An edge originating
at vertex v and terminating at vertex v′ is said to have
tail v (denoted by v = vt(e)) and head v′ (denoted by
v′ = vh(e)). The encoder Xavier at the source node s uses
the network G to transmit the source’s information X =
(X(1), X(2), . . . , X(n))T as defined in Section II to a set of
decoders, {Yvonne1, . . . ,Yvonne|T |}, located respectively at
the sink nodes T = {t1, . . . , t|T |}. Xavier uses M |T | random
m-vectors, denoted ρ = (ρk(i))i∈{1,...,M},k∈{1,...,|T |}.
A (v, v′, S)-cut between any v, v′ ∈ V is a partition of V
into S and V − S such that v ∈ S and v′ ∈ V − S. The
cut edge-set E(v, v′, S) comprises e ∈ E such that vt(e) ∈
S and vh(e) ∈ V − S. The min-cut capacity [3] is defined
as CMul = mink∈{1,...,|T |} minS |E(s, tk, S)|, and any such
minimizing E(s, tk, S)-cut is called a min-cut.
A network code CN is defined by its source encoder, internal
encoders, and decoders at receiver nodes.
The source encoder comprises a collection of functions
{fe}e∈ΓO(s). For each e ∈ ΓO(s), fe : (Fq)nR × (Fq)M|T | →
(Fq)n maps X and a set of random symbols ρk(i) to the length
n vector Y (e) transmitted across edge e. We denote by Y (e, i)
the ith symbol input to Y (e) for each e ∈ E , and denote by
Yˆ (e, i) the ith symbol output on edge e.
The internal encoders for all edges e /∈ ΓO(s) are functions
fe : (Fq)n|ΓI(vt(e))| → (Fq)n which map messages Y (e′) on
all links e′ incoming to vt(e) to the vector Y (e) transmitted
across edge e.
For each k ∈ {1, . . . , |T |}, decoder hk : (Fq)n|ΓI (tk)| →
(Fq)nR maps the collection Yˆk = (Yˆ (e, i))e∈ΓI (tk),i∈{1,...,n}
of received channel outputs to a reconstruction Xˆk of source
X . In particular, denote Yˆk(i) = (Yˆ (e, i))e∈ΓI (tk) and
Yˆk(e) = (Yˆ (e, i))i∈{1,...,n}.
Xavier and the Yvonnes together choose a code C =
((fe)e∈E , (hk)k∈{1,...|T |}), and inform each e of fe. This
code choice is fixed and known to Zorba, who also has full
knowledge of the source message X to be transmitted. Zorba
uses this information to choose the set Z ⊆ E of edges to
control. The size of Z cannot exceed the jamming dimension
M . We note that adversarial control of a vertex v ∈ V is
equivalent to adversarial control of all edges in ΓO(v), and
therefore we only consider the case where Zorba controls
edges.
For each e ∈ E we use Yˆ (e) to describe the channel
output of link e received by node vh(e). For each e /∈ Z
Yˆ (e) = Y (e). For each e ∈ Z , Zorba uses jamming function
ge : (Fq)nR × (Fq)nM → (Fq)n to produce corrupted output
Yˆ (e) = ge(X, (Y (e))e∈Z ). As in the unicast cast, the ges are
required to be causal in (Y (e))e∈Z , and defer the discussion
of the corresponding theorem for the case with non-causal
jamming functions to [1].
The error probability is defined as P (n)e =
Pr[∃k such that hk(g(X, (Y (e))e∈Z)) = X ]. Rate R is
achievable for jamming dimension M if for any  > 0
and n sufficiently large there exists a blocklength-n code
C with P (n)e <  for every jamming function g in the
family of jamming functions described above. The capacity
CAdv,Mul(M, |E|) of the given adversarial channel model
equals the maximal achievable rate.
Our key observations and ideas are as follows.
For each v ∈ V the encoding functions {fe}e∈ΓO(v) per-
form approximately n rounds of a robust algebraic network
code ([8], [9])). In the ith round the input to this algebraic
network code is X(i). After these rounds of transmitting the
actual information, s transmits to each receiver in succession
M(R + 1) symbols of header information using CMul edge-
disjoint paths.
We model the effect of the jamming functions as follows.
Let GZ be the graph obtained by attaching a new unit-rate
source node se,z to the midpoint of e for each e ∈ Z . The
message X(e, i) generated over the ith time interval by se,z
may be an arbitrary function of X and (Y (e′, i′))e′∈Z,i′≤i.
For each e ∈ Z the link output Yˆ (e) equals Y (e) + X(e, i).
Denote by XZ(i) the length-M vector (X(e, i))e∈Z .
Since the set Z is fixed and C is linear, for each k ∈
{1, . . . , |T |}
Yˆk(i) = TkX(i) + TZ,kXZ(i) (1)
for some fixed linear transforms Tk and TZ,k. We define the
interference at tk as δk(i) = TZ,kXZ(i). The linear span
of {X(i)}i∈{1,...,n−M|T |(CMul+1)} is a vector-space (denoted
VX ) of dimension at most R. Denote by TkVX the linear
span of {TkX(i)}i∈{1,...,n−M|T |(CMul+1)}. The linear span
of {XZ(i)}i∈{1,...,n−M|T |(CMul+1)} is a vector-space (denoted
by VZ ) of dimension at most M . Denote by TZ,kVZ the linear
span over i of {δk(i)}i∈{1,...,n−M|T |(CMul+1)}. By a direct
corollary of [10, Theorem 4], with high probability over code
design X(i) is retrievable from TkX(i), and VX ∩ VZ equals
only the zero vector (indeed, this is the property that implies
the existence of robust network codes). This implies that if
TZ,kVZ is known to Yvonnek, then X(i) is recoverable for
all i. (In contrast to the unicast case, she cannot here infer the
set EJ . She can, however, cancel out the interference effect.
Theorem 5 in Section IV shows a scheme for detecting the
set of edges which need to be cut to isolate Z from the
network.) To ascertain TZ,kVZ , we use a scheme similar to
the one developed in Section II.
Theorem 2:
CAdv,Mul(M,CMul) = (CMul −M)1(M/CMul < 0.5)
Further, for any n and any m = ω(log(n|E||T |)), there
exist block-length n codes with R = (1 − M |T |(CMul +
1)/n)CAdv,Mul(M,CMul), P
(n)
e < n|E|2−m(CMul−R), com-
plexity of design and encoding O(nm), and of decoding equal
to O((nmCMul)3).
Proof: Upper bound: The bound R ≤ CMul − M follows
since Zorba can choose Z to be in a cutset, and set Yˆ (e) = 0n
for all e ∈ Z .
If M > CMul/2 edges, R = 0 by the following argument.
Zorba chooses Z to be a subset of some min-cut E(s, t, S),
and an arbitrary multicast jamming subset JZ ⊂ Z of size
CMul − M . For an arbitrary X ′ = X and an arbitrary ρ′
Zorba mimics the network code C and for each e ∈ JZ sets
Yˆ (e) to what the message would have been on JZ if s had
input (X ′, ρ′), and Yˆ (e) = 0n ∀e ∈ Z−JZ . As in Theorem 1,
Yvonnek is unable to decide which X and X ′ to decode to.
Lower bound: We present a coding strategy using ideas
from the proof of Theorem 1.
Let R = (1 −M |T |(CMul + 1)/n)(CMul −M) and m =
Θ(log(n|T ||E|)). We show the existence of codes that achieve
R with P (n)e < 2−Ω(m(CMul−R)). There are two encoding
steps.
First, Xavier uses a robust network code n−M |T |(CMul +
1) times to multicast information to each tk. The input to C
during the ith use is X(i).
In the second step, the paths {Pi,k}i∈{1,...,CMul},k∈T (where
{Pi,k}i∈{1,...,CMul} comprise CMul edge-disjoint paths from
s to tk) are used to transmit identical copies of the header
information. This header information consists of M blocks,
each of length R+1, for each receiver. Since there are |T | re-
ceivers, this process is at most (R+1)M |T | channel uses over
Fq. The header information sent to tk is (Dk(j), ρk(j))Mj=1.
That is, each of the M blocks of length R + 1 in the header
to tk contains the random symbol ρk(i), and the length-R
hash-vector Dk(i). Each hash-vector Dk(j) is a distinct linear
combination of the X(i)s, defined as
Dk(j) =
n−(R+1)M|T |∑
i=1
ρk(j)i−1X(i).
For any k Zorba may control edges in less than half of
{Pi,k}CMuli=1 , hence the header information each sink receives
on more than half the paths is identical. At each tk Yvonnek
retrieves (Dk(j), ρk(j))Mj=1 by a majority decision.
Decoding by Yvonnek proceeds as follows. For all j ∈
{1, . . . ,M} she computes the vectors TkDk(j) and the vectors∑n−(R+1)M|T |
i=1 ρk(j)
i−1Yˆk(i). Using (1) we have
n−(R+1)M|T |∑
i=1
ρk(j)i−1Yˆk(i)
= TkDk(j) + TZ,k

n−(R+1)M|T |∑
i=1
ρk(j)i−1XZ(i)


= TkDk(j) +
n−(R+1)M|T |∑
i=1
ρk(j)i−1δk(i).
Hence Yvonne can retrieve M length-R vectors in TZ,kVZ ,
namely
∑n−(R+1)M|T |
i=1 ρk(j)
i−1δZ(i), denoted respectively
by Ak(j). We now prove that with high probability, for
each k ∈ {1, . . . , |T |}, {Ak(j)}j∈{1,...,M} forms a basis for
TZ,kVZ .
We denote by [∆] the matrix which has δk(i)s as row
vectors. Let Uk(i) = (ρk(i)j−1)
n−(R+1)M|T |
j=1 . We denote by
[U ] the matrix which has Uk(i) as row vectors. We note
that since Zorba controls at most M links, rank([∆]) is at
most M . We choose [∆′] to be any set of rank([∆]) linearly
independent columns of [∆]. Suppose that {Ak(i)}CMuli=1 does
not form a basis for TZ,kVZ . This means that for some linear
combination ck = (ck(1) . . . ck(rank([∆]))) the length-M
column vector [U ][∆′]ck equals the zero vector, though the
column vector [∆′]ck is non-zero (since by definition [∆′]
has full column rank). Thus the adversary would have to
choose the matrix [∆] so that the M polynomials which are
the elements of the column vector [U ][∆′]ck are all zero. By
a similar argument as in Theorem 1, the probability that this
happens is (n/q)M . Taking the union bound over all receivers,
the total probability of error equals |T |(n/q)M . 
IV. VARIATIONS ON THE THEME
We now analyze various related models.
1. Suppose, in addition to the conditions described in Sec-
tion III, Xavier (but none of the Yvonnes) knows Z , we denote
the capacity by CZ→X(M,CMul). Alternatively, if all of the
Yvonnes (but not Xavier) know Z , we denote the capacity by
CZ→Y (M,CMul). The following shows knowledge of Z at
tks is more useful than knowledge of Z at s.
Theorem 3:
CZ→X(M,CMul) = (CMul −M)1(M/CMul < 0.5)
CZ→Y (M,CMul) = (CMul −M)
Sketch of Proof: Both CZ→X(M,CMul) and
CZ→Y (M,CMul) must be at least as large as
CAdv,Mul(M,CMul) since Xavier and Yvonnek can
still follow the same strategy as when neither of them
knew Z . For all values of M , if Yvonnek does not
know Z , then Zorba can still follow the same strategy
as in the upper bound of Theorem 1, and therefore
CZ→X(M,CMul) = CAdv,Mul(M,CMul). However, if
Xavier uses fe as in Theorem 2 and Yvonnek knows Z , she
can with high probability infer Tk,Z and cancel the effect of
XZ(i) to decode. Hence CZ→Y (M,CMul) = CMul −M for
all values of M . 
2. Suppose each e ∈ E is noisy and has channel capacity
CNoise < 1, and Zorba controls some M edges. We denote
the overall capacity of this channel by CAdv,Noise(M,CMul).
Theorem 4:
CAdv,Noise(M,CMul) = CNoiseCAdv,Mul(M,CMul).
Sketch of Proof: Xavier first uses a channel code to make each
e noiseless and then uses the code of Theorem 1. No higher
rate is achievable since Zorba can use the same strategy as in
the upper bound in Theorem 1. 
3. Suppose Yvonnek wishes to find a set of links L which,
when removed from the network, would neutralize the effect
of Zorba without diminishing the multicast capacity. Let TL,k
be the linear dependence between X(i) and Yˆk(i) on removing
L from G.
Theorem 5: A set of edges L ⊂ E such that the network
code on the graph (V , E) induces a network code with the
same achievable rate on the graph (V , E − L) such that
Yˆk(i) = TL,kX(i) for all k exists and can be determined by
each Yvonnek.
Sketch of Proof: The same codes as in Theorem 2 are used.
Each Yvonnek first determines TL,kVZ , and then sequentially
considers all subsets of size M of E , and sees if any of them
induces the transform TL,k. She chooses the first such set and
calls it L. Due to random code design, with high probability
such a choice suffices. .
4. Suppose we allow secret feedback from each Yvonnek
to Xavier. We denote the capacity of this channel by
CFeedback(M,CMul).
Theorem 6:
CFeedback(M,CMul) = CMul −M.
Sketch of Proof: We use essentially the same codes as in
Theorem 2. Each Yvonnek transmits a secret key (not known
to Zorba) to Xavier. Instead of transmitting just the header, as
in Theorem 2, Xavier signs the header with the secret key us-
ing an information-theoretic authentication scheme (e.g., [11]).
This enables each Yvonnek to receive an uncorrupted header
even if only a single path from Xavier is uncorrupted. .
5. Finally, suppose Zorba is unaware of X , and embedded
within X is a message Xs that we wish to keep secret from
Zorba.
Theorem 7:
CAdv,Secret(M,CMul) = (CMul − 2M)1(M/CMul < 0.5).
Sketch of Proof: Every set U of links of size CMul − M
in every min-cut must contain enough information to be
able to decode X correctly. Therefore the number of links
Zorba does not observe in any set U is of size at most
CMul−2M , which proves our upper bound. We use the same
codes from Theorem 2 to prove achievability. The null-space
of the linear transform which takes X to {Y (e)}e∈Z is of
dimension n(|E| − 2M), which is asymptotically the same as
the dimension of the vector space in which the secret message
Xs sits. Thus with high probability over network code design
Xs will be secret from Zorba. .
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